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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ENDING ALIEN TORT STATUTE EXCEPTIONALISM:
CORPORATE LIABILITY IN THE WAKE OF JESNER V. ARAB BANK
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. PRIVATE MILITARY
CONTRACTORS
“Clearly abuses occurred at the prison at Abu Ghraib.” 1 The U.S. Army’s
report on human rights violations at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, commonly
referred to as the Fay report, accounts in graphic detail specific incidents
involving private military contractors (“PMCs”) 2 and members of the U.S.
military. 3 Disturbing photos of this abuse surfaced in the media in 2004, making
the infamous prison near Baghdad virtually synonymous with abuse 4 and calling
into question the United States’ moral standing in the world. 5

1. MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE R. FAY AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL ANTHONY R. J ONES, U.S.
DEPT . OF THE ARM Y, AR 15–6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND
205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE, at Executive Summary 3 (2004), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nationi/documents/fay_report_8-25-04.pdf [https://perma
.cc/L4NR-L77C] [hereinafter Fay Report].
2. The term “private military contractor” (“PMC”) connotes a firm that provides surrogate
military services to a government or sovereign. Andrew L. Pickens, Defending Actions Against
Corporate Clients of Private Security Companies, 19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 601, 603 (2017). The U.S.
government regularly outsources military functions to these private sector entities. Id. PMCs are
now a fact of modern warfare. Id. Not only to PMCs dominate the battlefield, they operate in a
“twilight zone” where accountability and oversight give way to “profit, efficient and politic al
expediency.” Thomas B. Harvey, Wrapping Themselves in the American Flag: The Alien Tort
Statute, Private Military Contractors, and U.S. Foreign Relations, 53 ST . LOUIS U. L.J. 247, 253
(2008).
3. To give a brief snapshot of the abuses, Incident #3 in the Fay Report recounts that on
October 25, 2003, three detainees “were stripped of their clothing, handcuffed together nude, placed
on the ground, and forced to lie on each other and simulate sex while photographs were taken.” Fay
Report, supra note 1, at 72. See also Atif Rehman, The Court of Last Resort: Seeking Redress for
Victims of Abu-Ghraib Torture Through the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 IND. INT ’L & COM P. L. Rev.
493 (2006).
4. RJ Vogt, CACI Sanctions Bid Says Abu Ghraib Prisoner Withheld Info, LAW 360 (June
22, 2018), https://advance.lexis.com/document?crid=53f36eda-6b65-40b3-8eb2-dc8ed76d3300&
pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Flegalnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5SMG-21
V1-DY33-B0FX-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=122080&pdalertresultid=994577661&pda
lertprofileid=d7055815-a473-4a89-8918-405d8b334cd7&pdmfid=1000516&pdisurlapi=true&
cbc=0 [https://perma.cc/JVF3-X9WZ].
5. Susan Sontag, Regarding the Torture of Others, N.Y. T IM ES MAG. (May 23, 2004),
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/23/magazine/regarding-the-torture-of-others.html?pagewanted
=all&src=pm [https://perma.cc/7YEZ-SA6Y].
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INTRODUCTION
Legal actions implicating violators of human rights in U.S. federal courts
typically result from claims brought under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) or the
Torture Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”). 6 The TVPA, enacted in 1992 as a
statutory note to the ATS, provides a cause of action for both United States
nationals and aliens (non U.S. citizens) for extrajudicial killing and for torture
committed under color of foreign law. 7 While the TVPA has a detailed
legislative history and creates a substantive cause of action, the ATS’s legislative
history is largely unknown and the statute is jurisdictional in nature. 8 Enacted
by the First Congress, the ATS is deceptively simple: it permits alien plaintiffs
to bring suit in U.S. district courts for violations of international law.
The ATS has several jurisdictional predicates. 9 At the outset, a court must
assure itself that: (1) the plaintiff is an alien (non U.S. citizen); (2) the complaint
pleads a violation of the law of nations; (3) the presumption against the
extraterritorial application of the ATS does not bar the claim; (4) customary
international law (“CIL”) recognizes the asserted liability alleged by plaintiffs
(e.g., aiding and abetting, conspiracy); and (5) if the international law violation
requires state action, the defendant is a state actor or acted under “color of
law.” 10 In Jesner v Arab Bank, 11 the Supreme Court added another jurisdictional
predicate. The Court was expected to decide whether the ATS categorically
forecloses corporate liability. 12 Rather than resolving this categorical question,
the Court opted for a narrower jurisdictional restriction: ATS suits may not
proceed against foreign (as opposed to American) corporations. 13
This article provides a critique of the Court’s analysis in Jesner and
discusses the decision’s impact on PMC litigation. Part I provides background

6. Pickens, supra note 2, at 610.
7. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994)) [hereinafter TVPA]; Ekaterina Apostolova, Comment, The
Relationship between the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 BERKELEY
J. INT ’L L. 640, 641 (2010).
8. Apostolova, supra note 7, at 642. See also IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d
Cir. 1975) (Friendly, J.) (“This old but little used section is a kind of legal Lohengrin; . . . no one
seems to know whence it came.”).
9. Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 165–66 (2d Cir. 2015).
10. See id.
11. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S.Ct. 1386 (2018).
12. Amy Howe, Argument analysis: Corporate liability for violations of international law on
shaky ground, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 11, 2017, 3:01 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/10/argu
ment-analysis-corporate-liability-violations-international-law-shaky-ground/ [https://perma.cc/X
R9W-WKMB]. The central issue posed in oral arguments was how to frame the role of international
law: should the Court look at whether there is a consensus that financing terrorism violates a norm
of international law, or instead at whether there is a consensus that corporations can be held liable
for such violations? Id.
13. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S.Ct. 1386, 1396 (2018).
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into the ATS and the viability of ATS suits against corporations leading up the
Jesner decision. In particular Part I focuses on the source of confusion over the
proper role of international law in ATS suits and the resulting circuit split created
by the Second Circuit.
In Part II, this article makes four observations about the Court’s analysis that
suggest the Court was motivated, above all else, by a desire to end the Jesner
litigation. 14 First, the Court could have resolved the case on narrower grounds
by remanding to address the issue of extraterritoriality or by deciding the
availably of the norm at issue—financing terrorism—rather than the much
broader issue of the availability of corporate liability. 15 Second, Justice
Kennedy’s plurality opinion perpetuated a misunderstanding of the role of
international law by requiring international consensus of the enforcement
mechanism, i.e. corporate liability, rather than the international norm allegedly
violated. 16 Third, Justice Kennedy failed to explain why the Court’s reliance on
separation-of-powers concerns or the plurality’s reliance on an analogy to the
TVPA foreclosed foreign, but not domestic, corporate liability. 17 Finally, the
five conservative justices expressed a willingness to close the door entirely to
ATS suits absent new legislation. 18
In Part III, this article proceeds to analyze Al Shimari v. CACI, an ATS case
brought against a PMC, and argues that Jesner should not affect the viability of
such cases in the near term. Courts may disregard Jesner’s erroneous application
of international law and its extension of deference to the political branches by
continuing to provide a forum for suits against U.S. defendants, including PMCs.
However, this article cautions that suits against PMCs face several unique
hurdles, as demonstrated by the Al Shimari litigation. Finally, in Part IV, this
article embraces the need for a legislative solution given the Court’s willingness
to foreclose ATS liability in the future.
P ART I: ATS BACKGROUND
A. Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute states in its entirety that “[t]he district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
14. Id. at 1399 (“The question whether foreign corporations are subject to liability under the
ATS should be addressed; for, if there is no liability for Arab Bank, the lengthy and costly litigation
concerning whether corporate contacts like those alleged here suffice to impose liability would be
pointless.”).
15. See infra Section II.A, A.The Court Could Have Decided Jesner on Narrower Grounds.
16. See infra Section II.B, B.Perpetuation of a Misunderstanding of International Law.
17. See infra Section II.C, C.Failure to Distinguish Between Domestic and Foreign
Corporations.
18. See infra Section II.D, D.Willingness to Overturn ATS Precedent: Closing The Door Sosa
Kept Open.
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committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”19
Notably, it says nothing about the identity of the defendant. The ATS was only
upheld as a basis for jurisdiction in two reported cases prior to 1980. 20 In 1980,
the Second Circuit revived the ATS in Filártiga v. Pena-Irala, 21 holding that the
ATS provided federal subject matter jurisdiction for a violation of the law of
nations—in that case, torture by a state official against a detainee. 22 The court
in Filártiga first reasoned that the enactment of the ATS was authorized by
Article III because “the law of nations forms an integral part of the common
law.” 23 Proceeding to the question of jurisdiction, the court found little doubt
that torture violated the law of nations, reasoning that “for purposes of civil
liability, the torturer has become like the pirate and slave trader before him hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.” 24
The Supreme Court took its first look at the ATS in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain.25 The Court noted that the ATS arose out of foreign relations
concerns. 26 The ATS was needed to address certain violations of international
law for which foreign nations might hold the U.S. responsible for an injury to a
foreign citizen. 27 For example, an assault against an ambassador impinged upon
the sovereignty of the foreign nation and if not adequately redressed could rise
to an issue of war. 28 The Court in Sosa found that the history of the ATS supports
two propositions. First, although the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no
new causes of action, the ATS was not “stillborn.” 29 Rather, the statute was
intended to have practical effect the moment it became law. 30 Second, Congress
19. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2012).
20. See Bolchos v. Darrell, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795); Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 865
(D. Md. 1961). See also Vasundhara Prasad, The Road Beyond Kiobel: The Fifth Circuit’s Decision
in Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. and Its Implications for the Alien Tort Statute, 59 B.C.L.
REV. E-SUPPLEM ENT 369, 390 n.19 (2018).
21. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
22. Id. at 878. “This is undeniably an action by an alien, for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations.” Id. at 887.
23. Id. at 886. The court reasoned that although the only express reference to the “law of
nations” in the U.S. Constitution is contained in Article I, sec. 8, cl. 10, which grants to the Congress
the power to “define and punish . . . offenses against the law of nations,” the Supreme Court has
long held that international law is part of U.S. domestic law. See id. at 886–87 (citing The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“International law is part of our law.”)).
24. Id. at 890.
25. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
26. Id. at 716.
27. Id. at 715–19 (The Continental Congress was hamstrung by its inability to “cause
infractions of treaties, or of the law of nations to be punished.”).
28. Id. at 715. Specifically, in the Marbois incident of May 1784, a French adventurer, De
Longchamps, verbally and physically assaulted the Secretary of the French Legion in Philadelphia.
Id. The incident put pressure on the Continental Congress to provide a civil remedy to aliens. Id.
29. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004).
30. Id. at 724.
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intended the ATS to enable federal courts to hear claims in a limited category
defined by the law of nations and recognized at common law. 31
The Court articulated this limited category through a two-step test. First, the
Court identified the types of international norms giving rise to ATS claims
[hereinafter, “Step I”]. Only claims of a “specific, universal, and obligatory”
nature are recognized under the ATS.” 32 Justice Souter concluded that the
judiciary ought to be free to consider certain violations of the law of nations
today and federal courts should not “avert their gaze entirely from any
international norm intended to protect individuals.” 33 The Court in Sosa
qualified Step I by announcing several practical considerations, which may
require the Court to give deference to other courts or decision makers,
[hereinafter, “Step II”]. 34 For example, the exhaustion principle might require
the claimant to exhaust any remedies available in the domestic legal system. 35
The political question doctrine may also necessitate judicial restraint. 36 The
Court noted a concern raised by the Government of South Africa that apartheid
cases brought in the U.S. interfere with the policy embodied by South Africa’s
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which “deliberately avoided a ‘victors’
justice’ approach to the crimes of apartheid.” 37 Accordingly, conduct which rises
to a violation of an international norm under Step I may nevertheless be
nonjusticiable under a variety of practical considerations.
B. Corporate Liability under the ATS
Thirty years after reviving the ATS in Filártiga, the Second Circuit took a
major step towards nullifying the statute when it created a bar to corporate
liability in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel I). 38 The Supreme

31. Id. at 712. The Court rejected Justice Scalia’s argument that Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938) closed the door to judicial recognition of international norms. Id. at 729 (“[T]he
door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping.”).
32. Id. Judge Posner explained the shortcomings of this standard in Flomo:
[L]ike so many statements of legal doctrine, this one is suggestive rather than precise; taken
literally it could easily be refuted. No norms are truly “universal”; “universal” is
inconsistent with “accepted by the civilized world”; “obligatory” is the conclusion not the
premise; and some of the most widely accepted international norms are vague, such as
“genocide” and “torture.”
Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011).
33. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004).
34. Id. at 732–33.
35. Id. at 733 n.21.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[I]mposing liability on corporations for violations of
customary international law has not attained a discernible, much less universal, acceptance among
nations of the world in their relations inter se. Because corporate liability is not recognized as a
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Court granted certiorari in 2013 to address the circuit split on corporate liability
created by the Second Circuit, but ultimately chose to address a different issue. 39
The Court reheard the case on the issue of extraterritorial application of the ATS
and determined that the presumption of extraterritoriality applied to the ATS:
“Where the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against
extraterritorial application.” 40 ATS claims for actions that occur abroad
perpetrated by foreigners against foreign victims—the so-called “foreign
cubed” 41 cases—must be dismissed. 42
By choosing not to address corporate liability in Kiobel II, the Court left the
Second Circuit’s Kiobel I precedent intact. This lead to an increasingly lopsided
circuit split on the issue of corporate liability, with the Second Circuit
“swimming alone.” 43 The Kiobel I decision is important because it broke with
every other circuit, but also because of the impassioned debate between Judges
Leval and Cabranes regarding the proper source of law for ATS enforcement. 44
The debate, relating to identification of an international norm under Step I,
stemmed from the proper interpretation of the oft-cited footnote 20 in Sosa,
which stated, “[a] related consideration is whether international law extends the
scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if
the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or individual.” 45 Justice
Souter compared two cases in footnote 20. 46 Both cases contemplated that

‘specific, universal, and obligatory’ norm, it is not a rule of customary international law that we
may apply under the ATS.”) (citation omitted).
39. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel II), 569 U.S. 108, 114 (2013).
40. Id. at 124–25.
41. Kiobel II “was a ‘foreign cubed’ case (foreign plaintiffs, foreign defendant, and foreign
conduct). Doe I v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1246 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
42. Kiobel II, 569 U.S. at 1245. To rebut the presumption of extraterritoriality, ATS cases
must typically meet one of the following requirements: (1) the alleged tort occurred on American
soil, (2) the defendant is an American national, or (3) the defendant’s conduct substantially and
adversely affects an important American national interest, including a distinct interest in preventing
the U.S. from becoming a safe harbor (free of civil as well as criminal liability) for a torturer or
other common enemy of mankind. Milena Sterio, Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations:
The Future of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INTL. L. 127, 128 (2018) (citing Kiobel
II, 569 U.S. at 127).
43. All the other circuits to consider the issue ruled or assumed that such cases can go forward
in U.S. courts. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc. (Al Shimari III), 758 F.3d 516, 530–31
(4th Cir. 2014); Doe v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014); Doe v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 527 App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013);
Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1017–1021 (7th Cir. 2011); Romero v.
Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
44. Judge Leval disagreed with the Judge Cabranes’ majority opinion, concurring only in the
judgment dismissing the case. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d 111, 152 (2d Cir. 2010).
45. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.20 (2004).
46. Id.
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certain forms of conduct violated international law only when done by a State
and not when done by a private actor acting independently of a State. 47
Judge Cabranes interpreted Sosa’s footnote 20 as requiring courts to look to
international law to determine the scope of liability for a particular type of
private actor, which may be different depending on whether the perpetrator is a
natural person or a judicial entity such as a corporation. 48 In reaching that
conclusion, Judge Cabranes relied on the fact that international criminal
tribunals have consistently limited their jurisdiction to natural persons. 49 In
dissent, Judge Leval noted that if read in context, the passage in footnote 20
confers a different meaning. 50 Far from implying that natural persons and
corporations are treated differently for purposes of civil liability under ATS,
footnote 20 implied that that they are treated identically. 51 Judge Leval argued
that the majority’s requirement that a particular form of civil remedy be
universally adopted “misunderstands how the law of nations functions.”52
According to Judge Level, international human rights law (“IHRL”) “leaves the
manner of enforcement, including the question of whether there should be
private civil remedies for violations of international law, almost entirely to
individual nations.” 53
Justice Kennedy acknowledged this debate between Judges Leval and
Cabranes in Jesner v. Arab Bank. 54 There, citizens of Israel accused Arab Bank
of financing terrorism by distributing funds to Palestinian terrorist groups
whereby Arab Bank cleared relevant transactions through its New York
subsidiary. 55 The district court dismissed the ATS claims against Arab Bank on
the sole ground that, under Second Circuit precedent, “plaintiffs cannot bring
claims against corporations under the ATS.” 56 On appeal, the Second Circuit
conceded that Kiobel II “cast[s] a shadow” on circuit precedent and noted that
Kiobel II “appears to reinforce Judge Leval’s reading of Sosa, which derives

47. Id. In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 794–95 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring), the D.C. Circuit found insufficient consensus that torture by private
actors violates international law. However, in Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241–42 (2d Cir.
1995), the Second Circuit concluded that genocide was generally accepted as violating the laws of
nations regardless of whether done by a State or by a private actor.
48. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 164–65 (Leval, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 132–37.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 165.
52. Id. at 175.
53. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 152.
54. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1399 (2018) (“The dispute centers on a
footnote in Sosa.”).
55. Id. at 1393.
56. In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 808 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2015).
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from international law only the conduct proscribed, leaving domestic law to
govern the available remedy.” 57
Still, the Second Circuit insulated its panel decision, declining to rehear the
case en banc. 58 Judge Pooler dissented in the decision not to rehear the case
noting that customary international law “does not contain general norms of
liability or non-liability applicable to actors.” 59 The Second Circuit’s refusal to
depart from its lone precedent in Kiobel I highlighted an “intra-circuit split,” and
reinforced the need for resolution by the Supreme Court. 60 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on April 3, 2017, to determine whether the ATS categorically
forecloses corporate liability. 61
P ART II: JESNER’S FRACTURED OPINION
As in Kiobel II, the Court in Jesner dodged the corporate liability question
for which it granted certiorari, albeit only partially. 62 In a fractured opinion,
Justice Kennedy garnered a five-member majority for only three parts of the
opinion, which expressly refused to extend the ATS to foreign corporations. 63
The five justices who voted to extend immunity to foreign corporations reasoned
that separation-of-powers and foreign relations concerns mandated deference to
the political branches. 64 Section II.A and Part III discuss how Jesner’s expansion
of separation of powers was unnecessary because the well-established
extraterritoriality and political question doctrines better address the foreign
policy issues in Jesner. Ultimately, the flawed and conflicting reasoning
supporting Jesner’s outcome suggests that the majority was motivated, above
all, to end the Jesner litigation. In the following sections, this article discusses

57. Id.; Jesner, 138 S.Ct. at 1395 (“[T]he courts of the Second Circuit deemed that broader
holding to be binding precedent. . . Since the Court of Appeals relied on its Kiobel holding in the
instant case, it is instructive to begin with an analysis of that decision.”).
58. In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 822 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2016).
59. Id. at 42.
60. Beth Van Schaack, The Inconsequential Choice-of-Law Question Posed by Jesner v. Arab
Bank, 24 ILSA J. INTL. & COM P. L. 359 (2018). Under Second Circuit practice, an en banc decision
is needed to overturn the corporate immunity holding in Kiobel I. Id. at 360, n.6 (citing Jones v.
Coughlin, 45 F.3d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that a decision by a panel of the
Second Circuit “is binding unless and until it is overruled by the Court en banc or the Supreme
Court”).
61. In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 822 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3466 (U.S. Apr. 3, 2017) (No. 16-499). According to the International Law
Scholars Amicus Brief in Jesner, the question for which the Court granted certiorari in Jesner “rests
on a fundamental misunderstanding of how international law works.” Brief of International Law
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 1, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386
(2018) (No. 16-499), 2017 WL 2859943, at *1.
62. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018).
63. Id. at 1386, 1394–98, 1402–03, 1406–07.
64. Id. at 1408.
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the Court’s choice to bar foreign corporate liability despite the availability of at
least two narrower grounds for deciding the case; the misunderstanding of
international law perpetuated by Justice Kennedy’s plurality; the failure to
analytically distinguish between U.S. and foreign corporations; and the Court’s
willingness to depart from its ATS precedent.
A. The Court Could Have Decided Jesner on Narrower Grounds
After previewing the history of the ATS and the Court’s decisions in Sosa
and Kiobel II, Justice Kennedy set the stage for dismissal on extraterritoriality
grounds. 65 Justice Kennedy noted that petitioners are foreign nationals who were
injured or killed by terrorist acts committed abroad over a ten-year period. 66 The
only connection to the U.S. is an “elaborate” banking system known as CHIPS
that allowed Arab Bank to clear dollar-denominated transactions through its
New York subsidiary. 67 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the clearance
activity is “an entirely mechanical function” subject to substantial regulations. 68
Although the Court acknowledged the problems with “foreign cubed” ATS
suits 69 and the tool available to dismiss those cases, extraterritoriality, 70 the
Court recharacterized this issue as a concern “unique” to foreign corporations. 71
Writing for a plurality, Justice Kennedy defended the Court’s decision not to
remand the case on extraterritoriality grounds, because “it is not the question on
which the Court granted certiorari, nor is it the question that has divided the
Courts of Appeals.” 72 Ironically, the Court did not fully answer that question. 73
Although the Court granted certiorari on the question of corporate liability,
lower courts would have benefited from guidance on extraterritoriality. 74 Both

65. Id. at 1393.
66. Id.
67. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1394.
68. Id.
69. See id. (“Modern ATS litigation has the potential to involve large groups of foreign
plaintiffs suing foreign corporations the United States for alleged human-rights violations in other
nations.”).
70. Id. at 1398 (quoting Kiobel II, 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013)) (“[E]ven where the claims
touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace
the presumption against extraterritorial application.”).
71. Id. at 1407.
72. Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1398–99.
73. Id. The question on which the Court granted certiorari and the question that divided the
Courts of Appeals was whether the ATS categorically forecloses corporate liability, regardless of
whether the corporation is foreign or domestic.
74. See Note, Clarifying Kiobel’s “Touch and Concern” Test, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1902, 1903
(2017) (“[T]here are many proposals for clarifying Kiobel’s ‘touch and concern’ test[.]”);
Vasundhara Prasad, The Road Beyond Kiobel: The Fifth Circuit’s Decision in Adhikari v. Kellogg
Brown & Root, Inc. and its Implications for the Alien Tort Statute, 59 B.C.L. REV. E. SUPP. 369,
370 (2018) (discussing uncertainty caused as to the test’s proper interpretation).
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the U.S. Government and Arab Bank argued that the case should be dismissed
under the doctrine of extraterritoriality. 75 In declining to meaningfully address
extraterritoriality, Justice Kennedy conceded that the Court’s corporate liability
holding was based in large part on a desire to end the lengthy litigation with
Arab Bank. 76
Applying the extraterritoriality doctrine in Jesner would have avoided the
unnecessary extension of immunity to foreign corporations who commit torts on
American soil. To overcome the presumption of extraterritoriality without a U.S.
defendant, ATS plaintiffs must either allege that the tort occurred on American
soil or that the defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affected an
important American national interest. 77 Justice Sotomayor provided an example
of a tort committed on American soil by “a [foreign] corporation posing as a jobplacement agency that actually traffics in persons, forcibly transporting foreign
nationals to the United States for exploitation and profiting from their abuse.”78
Permitting only individual liability in this case would not remedy the harm here
where the violations stemmed directly from corporate policy and practice. 79
The Court could also have avoided the corporate liability question by
remanding Jesner to determine whether financing terrorism is a “clear and
unambiguous” violation of the law of nations. 80 Justice Kennedy assumed that
“individuals who knowingly and purposefully facilitated banking transactions to
75. Brief for Respondent at 18, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018) (No. 16499), 2017 WL 3668990, at *18 (“Under Kiobel II, it should be clear that this case does not touch
and concern the United States. And it would be particularly appropriate for this Court to resolve
the extraterritoriality question because the Second Circuit has already indicated that it considers the
clearing of dollar-denominated transactions sufficient to give rise to ATS jurisdiction.”); Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 5, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138
S. Ct. 1386 (2018) (No. 16-499), 2017 WL 2792284, at *5 (“This Court should vacate the decision
below, which rests on the mistaken premise that a federal common-law claim under the ATS may
never be brought against a corporation. The particular claims in this case, however, present
significant extraterritoriality questions that warrant direct consideration by the court of appeals on
remand.”).
76. Id. at 1399.
The question whether foreign corporations are subject to liability under the ATS
should be addressed; for, if there is no liability for Arab Bank, the lengthy and costly
litigation concerning whether corporate contacts like those alleged here suffice to impose
liability would be pointless. In addition, a remand to the Court of Appeals would require
prolonging litigation that already has caused significant diplomatic tensions with Jordan for
more than a decade. So it is proper for this Court to decide whether corporations, or at least
foreign corporations, are subject to liability in an ATS suit filed in a United States district
court.
Id.
77. See Kiobel II, 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
78. Jesner, 138 S.Ct. at 1435.
79. Id.
80. See Id. at 1397. Justice Sotomayor would have remanded Jesner to determine whether
financers of terrorism are “common enemies of all mankind.” Id. at 1427.
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aid, enable or facilitate . . . terrorist acts would themselves be committing crimes
under . . . international-law prohibitions.” 81 Rather than applying Sosa’s
framework to the unsettled norm 82 at issue—financing terrorism—Justice
Kennedy disposed of the much broader issue of foreign corporate liability, 83
extending immunity under the ATS to foreign corporations who violate
international norms arising to the universal recognition of jus cogens, like
slavery and genocide. 84
B. Perpetuation of a Misunderstanding of International Law
Writing for a plurality, Justice Kennedy approved of Judge Cabranes’
interpretation of Sosa’s footnote 20 in Kiobel I and likewise concluded that
corporate liability is a question of international law and international law
precludes corporate liability. 85 Without resolving either point definitively,
Justice Kennedy found “at least sufficient doubt” to justify exercising judicial
restraint under Sosa’s Step II. 86
In her forceful dissent, Justice Sotomayor squarely addressed the plurality’s
misconception of these two points. 87 To the first point, Sotomayor reasoned that
“enforcement is not a question with which customary international law is
concerned:” 88
Sosa consistently used the word “norm” to refer to substantive conduct. [Sosa’s
caution against recognizing] “private claims under federal common law for
violations of a norm with less definite content and acceptance among civilized
nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted” . . .
would make little sense if “norm” encompassed enforcement mechanisms like

81. Id. at 1397.
82. See Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1429 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[Arab Bank’s augment that it
was not the direct cause of plaintiffs’ injuries] is a critique of the imposition of liability for financing
terrorism, not an argument that ATS suits against corporations generally necessarily cause
diplomatic tensions.”).
83. See id. at 1431 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The majority, however, prefers to use a
sledgehammer to crack a nut.”).
84. See Ursula Tracy Doyle, The Cost of Territoriality: Jus Cogens Claims Against
Corporations, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INTL. L. 225, 227 (2018) (“The jus cogens norm prohibits
genocide, torture, and other egregious conduct. It surpasses all other international law norms,
protects basic values, commits every State and allows no derogation.”).
85. Jesner, 138 S.Ct. at 1400. Giving “considerable force and weight to the position articulated
by Judge Cabranes,” Justice Kennedy determined that there is an “equally strong argument” that
petitioners in Jesner cannot demonstrate a “specific, universal, and obligatory norm of liability for
corporations.” Id.
86. Id. at 1391 (“[T]here is at least sufficient doubt on the point to turn to Sosa’s second
question: whether the Judiciary must defer to Congress to determine in the first instance whether
that universal norm has been recognized and, if so, whether it should be enforced in ATS suits.”).
87. Id. at 1420–25.
88. Id. at 1420 (internal citations omitted).
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corporate liability.” Unlike “the prohibition on genocide,” “corporate liability”
cannot be violated. 89

International law scholars and all but one circuit to address the issue agree. 90
Regarding the second point, even assuming international law controls the
specific form of liability ATS plaintiffs seek, international law does not prohibit
corporate liability. 91 Those who contend such a prohibition exists point to the
absence of corporate liability in the handful of international tribunals established
to respond to human rights catastrophes. 92 Justice Kennedy lists inter alia, the
Charter for the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the Statute of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 93 However,
by assuming that no norm of corporate liability exists based on the absence of
corporate liability in international tribunals, the Jesner plurality failed to
consider that “[n]o international tribunal has been created and endowed with the
jurisdiction to hold natural persons civilly (as opposed to criminally) liable.” 94
The debate over corporate liability in international tribunals reveals that a
court can always find “sufficient doubt” that that an enforcement mechanism has
achieved “universal, specific, and obligatory” status under Sosa’s Step I. 95 By
89. Id.
90. See supra, cases cited at note 43; see also Jack L. Goldsmith & Curtis A. Bradley, Federal
Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260 (1998) (“It is well
accepted that international law does not itself speak to whether or how it applies within particular
domestic regimes, but rather leaves this issue to be determined by domestic law.”). See also STEVEN
BREYER, T HE COURT AND T HE WORLD: AM ERICAN LAW AND T HE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 161
(Alfred A. Knopf 2015) (“As a technical matter, the ATS cases make clear that, when federal courts
apply the statute, they do not directly apply international law. Rather they apply American law—
namely, federal common law, which picks up some but not all international legal norms.”).
91. See Beth Van Schaack, The Inconsequential Choice-of-Law Question Posed by Jesner v.
Arab Bank, 24 ILSA J. INTL. & COM P. L. 359, 360–61 (2018) (“Although contentious, this choiceof-law debate proves to be inconsequential when it comes to the availability of corporate tort
liability, given that both bodies of law point in the same direction and hand victory, at least in this
round, to the plaintiffs. In other words, regardless of whether courts look to U.S. law or to
international law, the ATS supports corporate tort liability.”).
92. Kiobel I, 621 F.3d 11, 136 (2d Cir. 2010).
93. Jesner, 138 S.Ct. at 1423–24.
94. Id. at 1423. Judge Leval articulated this inconsistent reasoning best in his concurrence in
Kiobel I:
One of the main problems with the majority’s theory is its incoherence resulting from
the fact that it treats the absence of any international law precedent for imposition of
damages on corporations as barring such an award under the ATS, while acknowledging
that damages are properly awarded against natural persons notwithstanding the very same
absence of international law precedent for such awards.
Kiobel I, 621 F.3d at 184 n.41; see also, Lindsey E. Wilkinson, Piercing the Chocolate Veil: Ninth
Circuit Allows Child Cocoa Slaves to Sue Under the Alien Tort Statute in Doe I v. Nestle USA, 63
VILL. L. REV. T OLLE LEGE 20, 45 (2018).
95. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2019]

ENDIN G ALIEN TORT STATUTE EXCEPTIONALISM

361

accepting the Second Circuit’s reasoning that the jurisdiction of international
tribunals supports corporate immunity under international law, Jesner opened
the door to a holding that conspiracy and aiding and abetting liability are
similarly precluded by international law. 96
C. Failure to Distinguish Between Domestic and Foreign Corporations
Justice Kennedy’s opinion offered several arguments that apply equally to
foreign and domestic corporations and therefore do not support a holding limited
to foreign corporate immunity under the ATS. For example, Justice Kennedy
argued that the text of the ATS does not evidence Congress’s intent for the
statute to confer jurisdiction over claims against corporations; 97 that
international law does not recognize corporate liability; 98 that judicial
recognition of corporate liability violates separations of powers; 99 and that the
Torture Victims Protection Act is limited to individuals. 100
The text of the ATS itself says nothing about the type of defendant that may
be sued under the ATS. In fact, it says nothing about enforcement of the
prohibited conduct. 101 Nevertheless, writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy
reasoned that the language of the ATS does not support an exception to the
Court’s “general reluctance” to create new private causes of action. 102 Justice
Kennedy determined that the foreign-policy and separation-of-powers concerns
inherent in ATS litigation counsel against mandating “a rule that imposes
liability upon artificial entities like corporations.” 103 Still writing for the Court,
Justice Kennedy suggested that a proper application of Sosa may “preclude
courts from ever recognizing any new causes of action under the ATS” before
abruptly limiting the Court’s holding to foreign corporations. 104 The Court did
not explain what other “new causes of action” might fail under this “proper
application of Sosa.”
96. See Note, Alien Tort Statute—Foreign Corporate Liability—Jesner v. Arab Bank, Plc, 132
HARV. L. REV. 397, 404 (2018) (reasoning that ATS plaintiffs post-Jesner may no longer be able
to argue that accomplice liability is merely an “ancillary question”).
97. Jesner, 138 S.Ct. at 1402–1403.
98. Id. at 1400–1402.
99. See id. at 1402–03; Ursula Tracy Doyle, The Cost of Territoriality: Jus Cogens Claims
Against Corporations, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INTL. L. 225, 226 (2018) (noting that the TVPA
argument “would also apply, of course, to U.S. corporations”).
100. Jesner, 138 S.Ct. at 1404.
101. Id. at 1421 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The text of the ATS also reflects this distinction
between prohibiting conduct and determining enforcement. . . . The phrase ‘of the law of nations’
modifies ‘violation,’ not ‘civil action.’”).
102. Id. at 1402–03.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1403. (“But the Court need not resolve that question in this case. Either way, absent
further action from Congress it would be inappropriate for courts to extend ATS liability to foreign
corporations.”).
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Like the Court’s selective reliance on separation-of-powers concerns, the
plurality’s erroneous application of international law does not support the
distinction the Court drew between foreign and domestic corporations. Justice
Kennedy reframed the issue in Jesner by asking whether the Court has authority
to extend ATS liability to new private causes of action without express
authorization from Congress. 105 To that end Justice Kennedy first asked,
“whether the law of nations imposes liability on corporations,” and then,
“whether [the Court] has the authority and discretion . . . to impose liability on
a corporation without a specific direction from Congress to do so.” 106 Neither
question suggests that the answer depends on whether the ATS defendant is a
U.S. or foreign corporation.
With regard to the TVPA, the plurality argued that the lack of corporate
liability in the TVPA was “all but dispositive of the present case.” 107 Justice
Kennedy reasoned that the TVPA provides a logical statutory analogy to an ATS
common-law action and rejected attempts to distinguish the TVPA. 108 The
TVPA limits liability to an “individual” acting under color of law of any foreign
nation. 109 In addition to numerous other problems with this statutory analogy,110
it does not support a distinction between U.S. and corporate defendants.
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence provided the lone instance of a clear
distinction between domestic and foreign corporations, arguing that the ATS
requires diversity-of-citizenship under Article III. 111 Justice Gorsuch reasoned
that although the text of the ATS did not expressly call for a U.S. defendant, “it
likely would have been understood to contain such a requirement.” 112 Since the
ATS was enacted “in the shadow of the Constitution,” ATS suits must fit under
one of the nine Cases and Controversies enumerated in Article III. 113 Federal
question jurisdiction is not available, according to Justice Gorsuch, because ATS

105. Jesner, 138 S.Ct at 1394.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1404.
108. Id. at 1403–04.
109. Id. at 1404.
110. Jesner, 138 S.Ct. at 1432 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The plurality’s [TVPA analogy]
ignores the critical textual differences between the ATS and TVPA, as well as the TVPA’s
legislative history, which emphasizes Congress’ intent to leave the ATS undisturbed.”). See also
William J. Aceves, Correcting an Evident Error: A Plea to Revise Jesner v. Arab Bank, Plc, 107
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 63 (2018) (“[T]he placement of a statutory note in the U.S. Code by the Office
of Law Revision Counsel (“OLRC”) does not have any substantive impact on the law’s meaning,
interpretation, or application.”).
111. Jesner, 138 S.Ct. at 1415. Justice Gorsuch noted that the reason he would dismiss Jesner
was “[n]ot because the defendant happens to be a corporation instead of a human being.” Id. at
1412.
112. Id. at 1415.
113. Id.
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suits do not “arise under” federal law. 114 Therefore, because the ATS requires
an alien plaintiff, unless one of the parties is a diplomat, “an American defendant
[is] needed for an ATS suit to proceed.” 115
Although Justice Gorsuch’s diversity-of-citizenship argument draws a
formal distinction between domestic and foreign defendants, it strips the ATS of
its role in resolving cases of any importance. 116 Having established that the ATS
requires diversity-of-citizenship, Justice Gorsuch embraced the argument
advanced by Professors Belia and Clark that the ATS filled a jurisdictional gap
in the First Judiciary Act related to the amount in controversy requirement: the
ATS provides redress for “personal injuries that U.S. citizens inflicted upon
aliens resulting in less than $500 in damages.” 117 While this amount effectively
foreclosed tort actions at the time, 118 it is hard to imagine that victims of human
rights abuses would seek damages less than the amount in controversy
requirement today. Accordingly, Justice Gorsuch’s formalistic approach ignores
the ATS’s evolution over the past four decades and the realities of human rights
litigation.
D. Willingness to Overturn ATS Precedent: Closing The Door Sosa Kept
Open
The Court in Sosa held that “the door [to judicial recognition of actionable
international norms] is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping and thus open to

114. Id. at 1416 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (reasoning that the law of nations is part of general
common law, “but not part of federal law.”) (emphasis in original) (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 739–740 (2004)) (opinion of Scalia, J.)). Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Sosa
criticized the majority for coming to the opposite conclusion. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 746 n.* (“[A]
federal-common-law cause of action of the sort the Court reserves discretion to create would “arise
under” the laws of the United States, not only for purposes of Article III but also for purposes of
statutory federal-question jurisdiction.”). However, the majority did not expressly decide this issue,
and the Court noted that some common law claims derived from the law of nations may be brought
under the ATS, but not the federal question statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1331, lending some support to
Justice Gorsuch’s argument that ATS suits do not arise under federal law. Id. at 731 n.19.
115. Jesner, 138 S.Ct. at 1415.
116. Justice Alito, while embracing Gorsuch’s opinion, apparently acknowledged that Justice
Gorsuch’s diversity-of-citizenship theory would render the ATS superfluous:
Because this case involves a foreign corporation, we have no need to reach the question
whether an alien may sue a United States corporation under the ATS. And since such a suit
may generally be brought in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(2), it is unclear why ATS jurisdiction would be needed in that situation.
Id. at 1410 n.* (Alito, J., concurring).
117. Id. at 1417 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Bellia & Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and
the Law of Nations, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 445, 509 (2011)); see Michael L. Jones, Domesticating the
Alien Tort Statute, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 95, 99 (2016).
118. Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM . L. REV.
830, 900 (2006).
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a narrow class of international norms today.” 119 Despite the court’s narrow
formal holding in Jesner, five justices would either close the door to corporate
liability entirely or limit the ATS to U.S. defendants. Writing for the Court,
Justice Kennedy suggested that “a proper application of Sosa would preclude
courts from ever recognizing any new causes of action under the ATS.” 120 Three
justices—Kennedy, Roberts, and Thomas—would have foreclosed ATS liability
for all corporations based on the lack of corporate liability in the TVPA121 and
on Judge Cabranes’ argument that international law governs corporate
liability. 122
Justices Alito and Gorsuch would expressly overturn Sosa. Justice Gorsuch
“would end ATS exceptionalism” and refuse invitations to create new forms of
legal liability. 123 Moreover, Justice Gorsuch would eliminate liability for all
foreign defendants under his diversity-of-citizenship theory. Agreeing with
Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning, Justice Alito questioned whether Sosa was
correctly decided. 124 Justice Alito would permit ATS suits to proceed only where
doing so would “materially advance the ATS’s objective of avoiding diplomatic
strife.” 125
The Court’s failure to unite around a single rationale for granting immunity
to foreign corporations under the ATS suggests the conservative justices were
motivated, above all else, by a desire to end the Jesner litigation. In dissent,
Justice Sotomayor noted that Justice Gorsuch’s questioning of well-settled law
in Sosa was outside the scope of the issue of corporate liability. 126 In response
to Justice Gorsuch’s argument that the ATS was originally intended for a small
set of suits against U.S. defendants, Justice Sotomayor reasoned that Justice
Gorsuch’s requirement of a U.S. defendant in ATS suits would overturn Sosa,
which involved an ATS suit between two citizens of Mexico. 127
As for the conservative justices’ reliance on foreign relations concerns
necessitating deference to the political branches, Justice Sotomayor pointed to
the lack of empirical evidence supporting those “alarmist conjectures.”128 In
sum, Justice Sotomayor accurately observed that the majority provided no
support for the “unique problems” created by foreign corporations. 129
119. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
120. Jesner, 584 U.S. at 1403.
121. Id. at 1403–05.
122. Id. at 1399–1402.
123. Id. at 1413.
124. Id. at 1409.
125. Jesner, 584 U.S. at 1410.
126. Id. at 1427.
127. Id. at 1428 (“[Sosa] forecloses the argument the concurrence now makes, as Sosa
authorized courts to recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of “certain
international law norms.”).
128. Id. at 1436.
129. Id.
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ON PMC LITIGATION

Recent lower court decisions have followed Jesner’s formal holding,
dismissing claims against foreign corporations, 130 while choosing not to apply
Jesner’s separation-of-powers analysis to bar suits against domestic
defendants. 131 Still, the fact that U.S. corporations are seeking to dismiss ATS
claims in response to Jesner demonstrates the confusion created by the Court’s
analysis. 132 In rejecting an invitation to extend Jesner’s holding to U.S.
corporations, the court in Al Shimari highlighted the redundancy of Jesner’s
separation-of-powers reasoning given the well-established extraterritoriality and
political question doctrines.
Although ATS plaintiffs have been successful in limiting Jesner to its
formal holding, the Al Shimari litigation illustrates that these plaintiffs still face
an uphill battle. In addition to the extraterritoriality and political question
doctrines, PMCs have several other defenses available to thwart ATS litigation.
These doctrines and defenses underscore the impropriety of Jesner’s extension
of separation-of-powers.
A. Rejecting Jesner’s Broad Separation-of-Powers Holding
Two months after the Court decided Jesner, the district court in Al Shimari
v. CACI declined an invitation to extend Jesner’s holding to a PMC incorporated
in the U.S. 133 This line of cases, originally filed in 2008, alleges that the
plaintiffs, Iraqi citizens, were abused and tortured by employees of CACI, a
PMC incorporated in Virginia, while detained as suspected enemy combatants
at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. 134 Plaintiffs alleged that CACI’s employees
worked with military personnel to abuse plaintiffs, engaging in torture; cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment; and war crimes. 135
CACI moved to divest the court of subject matter jurisdiction for two
independent reasons based on the “test” established in Jesner. 136 According to
CACI’s proposed two-part test, (1) separation-of-powers concerns inherent in
the ATS preclude creation of private rights of action and (2) ATS claims may
130. See Kaplan v. C. Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 F.3d 501, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(affirming dismissal of ATS claims brought against foreign bank).
131. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 320 F.Supp.3d 781, 788, 2018 WL 3118183
(E.D. Va. June 25, 2018).
132. See Brill v. Chevron Corp., 15-CV-04916-JD, 2018 WL 3861659, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
14, 2018) (leaving for another day the question of whether Jesner’s holding on foreign corporations
should be extended to a domestic corporation such as Chevron).
133. Al Shimari, 320 F.Supp.3d at 788.
134. The factual background, detailing the abuses suffered by the Al Shimari plaintiffs is
described in detail in Al Shimari, 300 F. Supp. 3d at 762–71; see also supra notes 1–4. On
December 10, 2018, the court denied CACI’s Motion in Limine to Exclude the Fay Report.
135. Al Shimari, 300 F. Supp. 3d at 762–71.
136. Al Shimari, 320 F.Supp.3d at 782.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

366

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:349

not proceed where they do not further the ATS’s objective of preventing friction
between the U.S. and foreign nations. 137 CACI argued that Jesner requires courts
to undertake an “independent inquiry” before allowing an ATS claim to procced
and that plaintiffs have the burden to overcome Jesner’s two-part test. 138
The court rejected CACI’s interpretation of Jesner’s holding, 139 but went on
to determine that even under this proposed analysis, the plaintiffs nevertheless
made the required showing. 140 In reaching this decision, the court reasoned that
the Fourth Circuit had already addressed Jesner’s separation-of-powers
concerns in its rulings on extraterritoriality and the political question doctrine.141
In its 2014 decision addressing extraterritoriality under Kiobel II, the Fourth
Circuit found that allowing claims to proceed against CACI does not
impermissibly interfere with the political branches. 142 The ATS does not feed
international conflict between U.S. law and laws of foreign nations because the
ATS is purely jurisdictional and applies customary international law, which is
“necessarily recognized by other nations as being actionable.” 143 Further,
litigation of the claims in the case does not require “unwarranted judicial
interference in the conduct of foreign policy,” because the U.S. does not
“tolerate acts of torture, whether committed by U.S. citizens or by foreign
nationals.” 144
The Fourth Circuit’s 2016 decision addressing the political question
doctrine addressed any remaining separation-of-powers concerns articulated in
Jesner. 145 “The political question doctrine derives from the principle of
separation of powers and deprives courts of jurisdiction over controversies
which revolve around policy choices and value determinations constitutionally
committed to Congress or . . . to the executive branch.” 146 The political question
doctrine “is a narrow exception to the judiciary’s general obligation to decide
cases properly brought before the courts.” 147 Applying the political question
doctrine to the violations of international law at issue, the Fourth Circuit rejected
the district court’s finding that CACI’s acts were based on military judgement

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 784, n.4 (“[T]he better reading of Jesner’s interpretation of Sosa appears to be that
the federal courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction under the ATS in the exceptional case
when the defendant presents a clear justification to do so, as the Arab Bank did in Jesner.”).
140. Id. at 783–88.
141. Al Shimari, 320 F.Supp.3d at 785–86.
142. Id. at 785 (citing Al Shimari III, 758 F.3d 516, 529–30 (4th Cir. 2014)).
143. Id. (quoting Al Shimari III, 758 F.3d at 530).
144. Id. (quoting Al Shimari III, 758 F.3d at 530).
145. Id. at 785–86.
146. Al Shimari, 320 F.Supp.3d at 786–87 (quoting Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc. (Al
Shimari IV), 840 F.3d 147, 154 (4th Cir. 2016)).
147. Id. at 786 (quoting Al Shimari IV, 840 F.3d at 154).
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and expertise unsuitable for scrutiny by a court. 148 The court concluded that “the
separation of powers rationale underlying the political question doctrine does
not shield the contractor’s actions from judicial review.” 149
Finally, the court in Al Shimari determined that the presence of an American
defendant in ATS suits nullifies the foreign relations concerns articulated in
Jesner. 150 ATS suits involving foreign plaintiffs suing an American corporate
defendant fully align with the original goals of the ATS: “to provide a federal
forum for tort suits by aliens against Americans for international law
violations.” 151 Accordingly, the court found that the exercise of jurisdiction is
consistent with the purposes of the ATS and does not conflict with either the
holding or reasoning in Jesner. 152
B. An Uphill Battle for ATS Plaintiffs
Since Abu Ghraib victims filed suit against CACI in June 2008, the case has
survived claims that it presented a nonjusticiable political question, that the
defendants were immune from suit, that the plaintiffs’ claims were preempted
by the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred
by the statute of limitations, and that the plaintiffs’ claims failed to state
plausible allegations of conspiracy or aiding and abetting. 153 These represent
only some of the hurdles ATS suits must survive and underscore the impropriety
of Jesner’s expansion of separation-of-powers to justify its holding.
The political question doctrine presents a unique hurdle in ATS suits against
PMCs because an “ATS plaintiff must establish why the court should treat a
PMC’s actions as state actions yet simultaneously avoid implying the existence
of any political questions.” 154 The six-factor political question test established
in Baker v. Carr, 155 accords great deference to the executive branch views on
the justiciability of cases involving foreign affairs. 156 Complicating matters for
ATS plaintiffs, the executive branch has not displayed consistent views
regarding the ATS. 157 In Filártiga, the Justice Department intervened on behalf
of the Filártigas, which reflected the Carter administration’s view on the

148. Id. (citing Al Shimari IV, 840 F.3d at 155–58).
149. Id. (quoting Al Shimari IV, 840 F.3d at 158).
150. Id. at 787.
151. Al Shimari, 320 F.Supp.3d AT 787.
152. Id.
153. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 300 F. Supp. 3d 758, 771–76 (E.D. Va. 2018).
154. Jenny S. Lam, Accountability for Private Military Contractors Under the Alien Tort
Statute, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1459, 1489 (2009).
155. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
156. Id. at 211–12.
157. Compare Filartiga v. Pena Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (United States filed an
amicus brief in support of the plaintiff) with Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004)
(United States supported dismissal).
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importance of human rights. 158 Sosa represented a reversal in the government’s
position on the ATS. 159 The George W. Bush Justice Department filed amicus
briefs arguing that ATS cases should be heard only where Congress has, by
separate act, expressly given permission to file suit. 160 Most recently, in Jesner,
the U.S. Government took a middle position, urging the Court to remand the
case to let the Second Circuit address the issue of extraterritoriality. 161 The U.S.
Solicitor General, Brian Fletcher, argued on behalf of the U.S. Government
against a categorical rule barring corporate liability. 162
Like the political question doctrine, the presumption against extraterritorial
application of the ATS presents a difficult hurdle in suits against PMCs. The
appropriate application of the touch and concern test has recently given rise to a
circuit split between the Fourth Circuit in Al Shimari and the Fifth Circuit in
Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., another case involving ATS claims
brought against a U.S. PMC for torts committed in Iraq. 163 As noted above,
before the Fourth Circuit for the third time, the Al Shimari court held that the
plaintiffs’ claims for abuse and torture at the Abu Ghraib detention center in Iraq
touched and concerned the territory of the U.S. with sufficient force to receive
jurisdiction under the ATS. 164 While the Fourth Circuit employed a broad, factbased inquiry taking into account all pertinent facts underlying the plaintiffs’
claims, the Fifth Circuit in Adhikari took a restrictive approach looking only at
the conduct that was in violation of international law and the location of that
conduct. 165 This restrictive approach has the potential to immunize PMCs that
confine their illegal conduct to foreign countries. 166
In addition to the presumption against extraterritoriality and the political
question doctrine, ATS plaintiffs may have to overcome challenges based on

158. Rehman, supra note 3, at 505.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 504–05. But see Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1431 (2018) (“Notably,
the Government’s position that categorically barring corporate liability under the ATS is wrong has
been consistent across two administrations led by Presidents of different political parties.”).
161. Milena Sterio, Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations: The Future of the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 50 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 127, 134 (2018).
162. Howe, supra note 12; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Neither Party at 15, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1431 (2018) No. 16-488, 2017 WL
2792284, at *15.
163. Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 F.3d 184, 190–91 (5th Cir. 2017).
164. Al Shimari III, 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 2014).
165. Vasundhara Prasad, The Road Beyond Kiobel: The Fifth Circuit’s Decision in Adhikari v.
Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. and Its Implications for the Alien Tort Statute, 59 B.C. L. REV. ESUPPLEM ENT 369, 385–86 (2018).
166. See Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 197.
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forum non conveniens (“FNC”),167 comity, and exhaustion.168 Under a challenge
based on FNC, for example, ATS claimants must show that the alternative
forum, such as Iraq or Afghanistan, provides a remedy so clearly unsatisfactory
or inadequate that it essentially provides no remedy at all. 169
Finally, ATS plaintiffs may have to overcome claims of immunity by PMCs
based on FTCA preemption or the government contractor defense. The
government contractor defense presents an untested 170 obstacle to holding PMCs
accountable. The defense originated in Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,
where the Supreme Court found that state tort law “had to give way to ‘uniquely
federal interests’ in procuring equipment for the military.” 171 One commentator
argued that the “uniquely federal interests” in insulating federal contractors from
state tort law do not weigh in favor of insulating federal contractors from federal
law under the ATS. 172 Since violations of IHRL will presumably violate official
U.S. policies, ATS claimants can often establish state action without implication
of the discretionary judgements or official policies of the U.S. Government. 173
Al Shimari supports this approach. 174

167. FNC allows a court to dismiss a case, in its discretion, when “an alternative forum has
jurisdiction to hear [a] case and (2) trial in the chosen forum would establish . . . oppressiveness
and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff’s convenience, or . . . the ‘chosen
forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court’s own administrative and
legal problems.’” Lam, supra note 158, at 1480 (citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
241 (1981) (internal quotation omitted)).
168. Kiobel II analyzed the presumption against extraterritoriality in connection with related
limitations such as exhaustion, forum non conveniens (“FNC”), comity, and the practice of courts
giving weight to the views of the Executive Branch. Kiobel II, 569 U.S. 108, 133 (2013) (Breyer,
J., concurring).
169. Lam, supra note 154, at 1482.
170. The defense has not yet been extended to cover PMCs violation the law of nations. Id. at
1485 (citing Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988)); see Al Shimari v. CACI
Premier Tech., 300 F. Supp. 3d 758, 787 n.32 (E.D. Va. 2018) (reserving the issue of derivative
immunity as a government contractor for summary judgement).
171. Lam, supra note 154, at 1485 (quoting Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504). In Boyle, the Court found
that the FTCA, which allows individuals to sue the U.S. Government for torts committed by persons
acting on behalf of the federal government, precluded liability against government contractors for
design defects in military equipment. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
172. Lam, supra note 154, at 1486–87.
173. Id. at 1487.
174. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., 300 F. Supp. 3d 758, 781 n.27 (E.D. Va. 2018). In Al
Shimari, the court rejected CACI’s argument that much of the alleged conduct involved “practices
that were expressly permitted by the executive branch” because “the memoranda authorizing these
[extreme interrogation] techniques were rescinded by the executive branch in December 2003,”
and regardless, memoranda written by the executive branch cannot overcome domestic judicial,
executive, and military authority to the contrary, in addition to corroborating international law
sources. Id. In a concurring opinion overturning the district court’s dismissal of the case on politic al
question grounds, Judge Floyd confirmed that “it is beyond the power of even the President to
declare [torture] lawful.” Al Shimari IV, 840 F.3d 147, 162 (4th Cir. 2016) (Floyd, J., concurring).
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P ART IV: LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION
In Jesner, the Court declined to extend ATS liability to foreign corporations
without express authorization from Congress. 175 Justice Kennedy’s plurality
opinion found this holding necessary because of the possibility that permitting
such liability would allow other nations to hale U.S. corporations into foreign
courts for violations of the law of nations. 176 The final part of Justice Kennedy’s
plurality opinion described Congress’s possible responses to Jesner. 177 Justice
Kennedy characterized the decision to preclude foreign corporate liability under
the ATS as a matter of first impression—the First Congress provided a federal
remedy only for a narrow category of international-law violations committed by
individuals. 178 Accordingly, “[t]he political branches can determine, referring to
international law to the extent they deem proper,” (1) whether to impose liability
upon foreign corporations and, conversely, allow other countries to hold U.S.
corporations liable; (2) whether to subject such liability to “limitations or
preconditions” based on the unavailability of “neutral judicial safeguards” in
other countries; and (3) whether corporate liability should be “limited to cases
where a corporation’s management was actively complicit in the crime.” 179
Justice Kennedy’s suggestions to Congress involved questions of comity
and direct (as opposed to indirect) liability. Comprehensive legislation could do
much more, especially with regard to PMCs. Legislation could clarify a host of
frequently litigated issues like the “touch and concern test,” immunity for
defense contractors, FTCA preemption, comity, exhaustion, and the statute of
limitations. A recent article discussing the need for clarity in defending lawsuits
against PMCs emphasized the need for a comprehensive legislative solution to
the “current patchwork of laws” governing PMC liability. 180 In a democracy,
“the state should have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in the
interest of public order.” 181 However, PMCs act as an extension of the state, and
reliance on PMCs is increasing. 182 There are many advantages to comprehensive
PMC legislation including greater legal predictability in the contractor industry,
increased business efficiency, and greater comfort on the part of the public. 183
Further, given that PMCs are often populated by alumni of the U.S. military and
are headquartered in the U.S., legislation would improve international
175. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1403 (2018).
176. Id. at 1407.
177. Id. at 1407–08.
178. See Id. at 1408 (“[J]udicial deference requires that any imposition of corporate liability on
foreign corporations for violations of international law must be determined in the first instance by
the political branches of the Government.”).
179. Id. at 1407–08.
180. See Pickens, supra note 2, at 641–42.
181. Id. at 640.
182. Id. at 640–41.
183. Id.
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confidence in U.S. policy. 184 A plan for oversight would indicate that the U.S.
government is aware and responsible. 185
Calls for legislative action affecting PMCs target many different institutions
including U.S. military law, U.S. criminal law, International Human Rights Law,
International Criminal Law, and the ATS. 186 Amending the ATS is the most
logical way to ensure the viability of claims against PMCs, especially
considering that the plurality opinion in Jesner turned on the lack of corporate
liability under the TVPA. An express cause of action for violations of
international law, brought by aliens against PMCs, would satisfy the Jesner’s
concerns over separation-of-powers while leaving the ATS intact. 187
CONCLUSION
Jesner’s fractured reasoning behind granting ATS immunity to foreign (but
not domestic) corporations suggests the conservative justices were motivated,
above all else, by a desire to end the Jesner litigation. Justice Sotomayor
concluded her dissent by taking aim at the Court’s leniency towards
corporations. She warned that corporate immunity under the ATS “undermines
the system of accountability for law-of-nations violations that the First Congress
endeavored to impose.” 188 As in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby, Jesner
allows corporations “to take advantage of the significant benefits of the
corporate form and enjoy fundamental rights . . . without having to shoulder
attendant fundamental responsibilities.” 189 The Court’s fractured opinion
resulted from the conflict between a corporation friendly Court and a statute that
does not tolerate corporations who abuse their power. 190
184. See id. at 642.
185. Pickens, supra note 2, at 642.
186. See generally Angela Snell, The Absence of Justice: Private Military Contractors, Sexual
Assault, and the U.S. Government’s Policy of Indifference, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1125 (2011).
187. The Legislative history of the TVPA makes clear that the ATS “remain[ed] intact to permit
suits based on other norms that already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of customary
international law.” H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, at 4 (1991).
188. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1437 (2018).
189. Id. (citing Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 2751 (2014)); see Milena Sterio, Corporate Liability for
Human Rights Violations: The Future of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT ’L L.
127, 134 (2018) (noting that the business community is united against extending ATS liability to
corporations).
190. “Multinational companies have faced dozens of suits accusing them of playing a role in
human rights violations, environmental wrongdoing and labor abuses. Exxon Mobil Corp., CocaCola Co., Pfizer Inc., Unocal Corp., Chevron Corp., Daimler AG and Ford Motor Co. have all been
sued under the Alien Tort Statute.” Greg Stohr, Company Exposure to Human-Rights Suits Gets
U.S. High Court Look, BLOOM BERG LAW (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/
blaw/document/ONU5L76K50XV?bc=W1siU2VhcmNoIFJlc3VsdHMiLCIvc HJvZHVjdC9ibGF
3L3NlYXJjaC9yZXN1bHRzL2ZmY2ZlYT U3Mjc0NWYyN2YyOWM3NzU1NGUyNWU2ZjB
hIl1d—5db33e6d1aa015f94 [https://perma.cc/FKU8-QA5Q].
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While the Al Shimari litigation supports the viability of ATS claims against
PMCs in the near term, the two-century old statute stands on shaky ground. 191
The conservative justices demonstrated a willingness not only to construe the
Court’s ATS precedent narrowly, but to overturn its precedent altogether. As the
federal judiciary increasingly reflects the ideology of the Court’s most
conservative justice, 192 ATS plaintiffs can no longer rely on U.S. courts to carry
the torch of enforcing international human rights law. The Court may have
exercised restraint in limiting Jesner’s formal holding to foreign corporations,
but ATS plaintiffs should not expect mercy in the next ATS decision. Congress
must protect the ATS and ensure that no corporation is exempt from the law of
nations.
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